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Irony as a Metapragmatic Problem*1
Irony is a highly complex phenomenon with varied forms of manifestation, oc-
curring naturally in the most diverse scenes of communication. It is employed in 
everyday conversation just as much as in literary discourse, be it popular fi ction 
or a more elevated form of literature. Public speakers are keen to exploit its con-
vincing power, as are newspaper columnists intent on bringing their readers to 
‘read between the lines’. In scientifi c discourse, it is especially prevalent in genres 
profi ling a critical attitude (reviews, disputes), although in a subtle or covert way 
it also frequently appears elsewhere.
In general, linguistic irony makes available to the speaker, and invites the 
reader to recognize, a form of context-dependent implicit evaluation. By adopting 
an ironic stance, speakers express their self-refl ective detachment from the rep-
resentation brought under the scope of irony, questioning the appropriateness of 
its inherent vantage point, and implicitly off ering a diff erent one from which the 
situation in focus can be better assessed.
(1) Having been thrown out of Cambridge for improper tie wear and engagement 
in immoral aff airs, I enrolled to University College London.
In the literary excerpt in (1), which is the fi rst sentence in Antal Szerb’s short 
story Cynthia, the speaker casts doubt on the appropriateness of rules that treat 
improper tie wear and engagement in immoral aff airs as equally serious types of 
off ence. However, as the quote comes from the fi ctitious narrator of a short story, 
irony may also be directed at the narrator himself. Th is reading is suggested by the 
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possibility that the author, counting on shared background knowledge, uses the 
passage to undermine the narrator’s credibility, at least as far as the role of improper 
tie wear is concerned (cf. Tátrai 2007, 2008).
Th e paper is structured as follows. First, I will briefl y review the historical 
background behind the interpretation of irony I have suggested above (1), taking 
both rhetorical and philosophical traditions into account (1.1), in turn brought to 
bear on the dilemmas faced by pragmatic theory (1.2). In 2, this will be followed 
by the delineation of an interpretive framework (characterized by a functional 
cognitive theoretical orientation) which takes perspectivization to be the crucial 
property of irony, and treats the latter as a metapragmatic phenomenon stemming 
from the speaker’s critical, self-refl ective attitude to his/her own language use.
1. Historical background
1.1. Rhetorical and philosophical traditions
With respect to irony, the commonplace that there is nothing new under the sun is 
well worth reiterating. As it turns out, most of the key notions off ered by contem-
porary pragmatic theory (pretence, attitude, contrast, etc.) were already applied 
to irony in Antiquity.
Th e original meaning of the Greek word ειρωνεία is ’pretence’, especially the 
’pretence of being ignorant’. Th is formed the basis of the eirôn fi gure that, along 
with its opponent the alazôn, was a stock character of 5th century BC Greek comedy. 
Th e basic schema underlying the comedies concerned was that the eirôn, a man of 
lower stature and social status used his cunning wit (the pretence of being ignorant) 
to bring down the alazôn, a vain but stupid character boastful of his magnifi cence 
(cf. Veres 1977). Th is interpretation was not only popularized in comedies, but 
also lived on in Aristotle’s work when he contrasted irony with boastfulness (cf. 
Aristotle 1997), defi ning the former as the pretence of having less, and the latter 
as the pretence of having more than one actually possesses. Th e close link between 
irony and comedy (or ridicule) was further reinforced by the rhetorical tradition, 
as the subtle wit of irony was fi rst contrasted with buff oonery (bomolochy), then 
discussed among the various modes and degrees of ridiculousness (cf. Szabó/
Szörényi 1997: 140–144).
Socrate marked an important change in the interpretive history of irony. He 
considered it not so much as a device to be used to comic eff ect, but rather as a rhet-
orical procedure subservient to discovering the truth. As Plato’s dialogues amply 
illustrate, the key to his irony is that the speaker discredits or refutes the listener’s 
position precisely by pretending to agree with it. Th erefore, Socrate’s irony partly 
relies on earlier interpretations of irony that defi ned it as the pretence of being 
ignorant. Th ere is also a crucial diff erence, however, which has a profound impact 
on the value system attached to the phenomenon. Socrate’s irony is not meant to 
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deceive the discourse partner; on the contrary, it serves their joint eff ort to discover 
the truth. Th e destabilization of an evaluative vantage point is the fi rst step toward 
replacing it with a more adequate one, to be adopted both by the listener within 
the dialogue, and by the reader comprehending the dialogue “from without”. A fur-
ther important point is that Socrate’s irony is more than a rhetorical technique. In 
a broader, philosophical sense, this kind of ironic attitude represents a particular 
outlook on life (ironia vitae), characteristic of certain people’s approach to the things 
and events of the world (cf. Veres 1977, Behler 1998, Oesterreich 2001).
Th e authors of Latin rhetorical books (Cicero, Quintilian, Cornifi cius) were 
aware of the signifi cance of Socrate’s interpretation of irony, and as a result, treated 
irony as a manifestation of wit rather than as a comic device. In their view, however, 
irony was not so much a method or operation for exposing inadequacies but rather 
a rhetorical device (ironia verbi) to be listed among the tropes (cf. Lausberg 1960: 
302–303, 446–450; Oesterreich 2001; Tátrai 2008). Quintilianus (2008: 582–584) 
and subsequent interpretations defi ned irony as a fi gure of immutation allowing the 
speaker to mean the opposite of what he says (when appropriate contextual clues 
are in place): dispraise something while pretending to praise it, or (less frequently) 
the other way round. Hence, irony could now stand in contrast with metaphor: it 
was argued that while replacement was based on similarity in the latter’s case, irony 
relied on opposites, which was now seen as the shared category-defi ning feature 
uniting various types of irony (cf. Komlósi 2008: 96–101). Following Quintilian 
(2008: 558), Cornifi cius (2001: 107–108) discussed irony as a particular form of 
allegorical speech, which used opposites rather than similarities to the eff ect that 
the public speaker could mean something diff erent from what he literally said. 
Th is interpretation (based on opposites and contrast) came to be predominant in 
the rhetorical (and more recently, stylistic) treatments of irony in later centuries.
In addition to rhetorical and stylistic interpretations, irony has also been 
addressed from philosophical and literary theoretic perspectives, which focus on 
irony as a philosophico-aesthetic category. As has been suggested above, Socrate 
had an important role in opening the way for the philosophical interpretation of 
irony, leading to a view of ironic attitude as an ideal outlook on life in Renaissance 
Humanism. It was not until Romanticism, however, that irony came to the fore-
front of attention in aesthetic philosophy. Romantic authors breaking away from 
the rhetorical tradition (Schelling, Schlegel, Solger) went as far as regarding irony 
as a universal paradigm (ironia entis). According to Schlegel, irony is infi nite, as 
it lies in the constant alertness and awareness of infi nite chaos, which demands 
a continuous shift ing between opposite viewpoints. Th is calls for a visionary form 
of art that is continuously creating and destructing itself. While Schlegel places 
irony between the comic and the tragic, irony necessarily involves an experience 
of the tragic in Hegel’s objective dialectics. By contrast, Kierkegaard argues that it 
is precisely irony that precludes the tragic by replacing it (cf. Veres 1997, Behler 
1998, Oesterreich 2001).
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In modern times, irony is regarded not so much as a universal principle or 
outlook on life but as a particular (but easily generalizable) manner of speaking, 
which exploits the context’s role in inducing semantic shift s (cf. e.g. Bahtyn and 
Brooks). Postmodern approaches inspired by Nietzsche are closely related to the 
romanticist conception of irony. For example, deconstructionists also reject the 
binary model inherent in the interpretation of irony in the rhetorical tradition (cf. 
e.g. de Man 1996, Rorty 1994). Th ey regard irony as an infi nite shift ing or turn-
ing of meanings, eliminating the fi xed opposition between what is said and what 
is meant; furthermore, they also question the fi xation or indeed the fi xability of 
evaluative vantage points. Finally, Umberto Eco’s (1994) explanation (of a hermen-
eutic orientation) links irony to a feeling of déjà vu (as every utterance seems to 
be a quote of something already played out), and regards the ironic attitude to the 
functioning of language as a distinctive property of postmodernism. 
1.2. Th e dilemmas faced by pragmatic theory
Although irony has always been a key concern of rhetorical and stylistic studies, 
research on the phenomenon took a new dimension as a pragmatic perspective was 
increasingly adopted. Within linguistic pragmatics, irony has received relatively little 
attention in the Austinian tradition, whose chief concern has been with the issues of 
speech acts (but see Hartung 2002). By contrast, the followers of Grice have assigned 
it a central status, and treated it as a particular form of implicit meaning construal 
serving the strategic avoidance of explicitness (cf. Gibbs / Colston ed. 2007).
Under the assumptions of Grice’s (1975) theory of interaction, the implied 
meaning associated with irony is analysed in terms of a conversational implicature 
based on the delibarate violation of the maxim of quality (‘Do not say what you 
believe to be false’). His example is the following:
(2) X is a fi ne friend.
Th e assertion in (2) is made by the speaker aft er X, in whom he had full confi -
dence before, discloses one of his business secrets to a rival company. According to 
the explanation, irony manifests itself when it is completely clear to the discourse 
partners that the speaker has said something that he does not believe in (with the 
listener knowing that the speaker knows that he knows this). Th is leads the listener 
to the hypothesis that the speaker must have meant something diff erent from what 
he literally said, which happens to be nothing but its opposite. Th is interpretation 
of irony has close ties with traditional analyses based on meaning reversal, and 
further resembles classical rhetorical explanations in deducing irony from a contrast 
between literal and non-literal (fi gurative) meaning.
Subsequent pragmatic interpretations rely heavily on Grice’s approach, and 
continue to work with a two-step model to account for the processing and compre-
hension of irony. Th ey do so despite signifi cantly reinterpreting both the relation-
ship between literal and fi gurative meaning, and the nature of meaning reversal. In 
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Attardo’s (2000a, b) two-step model, the processing of irony involves the following 
procedures. First, the listener comprehends the primary meaning of what the speaker 
has said; however, he/she also notices that it is contextually inadequate (in part or 
in full). Th is invites him/her to take a second step and search for an alternative 
interpretation that is maximally relevant in the context at hand until he/she arrives 
at an ironic reading. In Giora’s (1998, 1999, 2003) model, the point of departure is 
the most salient meaning (rather than the literal one), which is the most easily ac-
cessible, and shows the highest degree of routinization and conventionality; irony 
results from it by indirect negation. (For an in-depth discussion of these two-step 
models, see Komlósi 2008.)
More radical departures from Grice’s classical explanation highlight the idea 
that information is processed simultaneously from both the linguistic representa-
tion and its discourse context during the comprehension of irony (cf. Gibbs 1994, 
Colston 2000, Colston / Gibbs 2007: 1–7).
Working in a cognitive pragmatic framework, Sperber / Wilson (1981, 1990, 
1992, 2004) break away from explanations assuming semantic reversal and a binary 
opposition between literal and non-literal meaning, and introduce a model of irony 
whose affi  nities lie with romanticist and postmodern (rather than classical rhet-
oric) treatments. In their view, irony is a kind of evaluative attitude (communicated 
implicitly rather than explicitly), which is associated with what they call an “echoic 
mention”. For them, echo has a broader sense than quoting, as it includes any re-
mentioning of thoughts, opinions, etc. as well as concrete utterances. Th ey can be 
either real or imagined, and may be attributed to either a particular person or (in 
the form of norms and expectations) to an entire community.
(3) Now that’s what I call a tidy room.
Th e ironic utterance in (3), the likes of which parents oft en resort to on enter-
ing their child’s room, directs criticism at the addressee, the source of irony being 
a general social norm violated by the situation in question.
On the account off ered by Sperber and Wilson, the ironic interpretation of 
an utterance (or its part) comes from the recognition that an echoed representa-
tion is inappropriate under the current circumstances of communication, as it is at 
odds with the state of aff airs which it is meant to represent. Th e listener therefore 
performs inferences to arrive at an interpretation that best satisfi es the discourse 
partners’ communicative demands (the fundamental assumption being that every 
utterance conveys a presumption of its own optimal relevance). Hence, this model 
eliminates the two-step solution, only requiring the assumption that the unit to be 
understood ironically is an echoic mention. Concomitantly, it is also able to motivate 
why ironic interpretations are sometimes easier to access and more straightforward 
than ‘serious’ ones. For example, it can account for the conventionalized ironic use 
of expressions such as icing on the cake, edifying sight etc. Furthermore, the model 
also questions the strict dichotomy between literal and non-literal meanings, or 
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more specifi cally non-ironic and ironic interpretations. As a result, it can explain 
why there are various kinds of ironic attitude (and consequently various levels of 
irony) ranging from the hardly noticeable to the highly off ensive, with transitional 
cases in between. Sperber and Wilson illustrate this point by the following example, 
taken from Mark Anthony’s speech in Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar:
(4) Brutus is an honourable man.
Th e statement in (4) occurs four times in Mark Anthony’s speech. However, 
each time there is a slightly diff erent attitude attached to the representation, which 
may be regarded as the echo of public opinion. In the fi rst case it marks a concilia-
tory attitude, then it becomes increasingly disdainful to the point of being outright 
sarcastic on its fourth appearance.
2. Irony, perspectivization, and metapragmatic refl ection
2.1. Irony as perspectivization
In what follows, I set out to outline a possible interpretation of irony that draws on 
Sperber and Wilson’s model, taking over and reinterpreting its key tenets in a func-
tional cognitive pragmatic framework (cf. e.g. Verschueren 1999, Tomasello 1999).
My point of departure is that irony is amenable to a description in terms of 
the organization of perspective (cf. Kotthoff  2002). During the production and 
comprehension of utterances, a key role is played by the position (perspective) 
from which the speaker views the elements of the discourse universe. Th is means 
that the study of perspective needs to take the following two components into 
account, which mutually presuppose each other: 1) the vantage point, i.e. the 
viewpoint from which something is represented, 2) orientation, i.e. the resulting 
specifi c representation of objects once a particular vantage point is taken (Sanders 
/ Spooren 1997: 86, cf. Langacker 1987). Th e viewpoints utilized in the utterance 
are to be interpreted with respect to the referential centre defi ned by the speaker’s 
person and his/her position in space and time.
In addition to the referential centre, a further important context-dependent 
vantage point is the subject of consciousness, which is also central to the functioning 
of irony. It is associated with the person to whom active consciousness (perception, 
volition, thought or speech) is attributed regarding the information conveyed. Th e 
notion of subject of consciousness highlights the subject-bound nature of linguistic 
cognition, cf. Brunner’s (1986: 26) related term of “subjunctivizing reality”. Any 
experience about the world is necessarily fi ltered through the speaker’s mind before 
she can share it with others. Hence, it is the speaker herself who acts as the subject 
of consciousness by default, assuming responsibility for the message even in the 
absence of explicit markers of this. However, since the speaker regards not only 
herself but also others as mental agents (i.e., she can identify with others), she is 
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able to evoke their mental states or even their participation in a discourse. Th is 
means that she may resort to perspectivization, i.e., shift  this centre of orientation 
onto another person (cf. Sanders / Spooren 1997: 86–95).
Clearly, perspectivization has a direct bearing on the interpretation of an ut-
terance (part) as ironic, since a crucial prerequisite to the recognition of irony is 
the realization that the speaker has withdrawn responsibility for what she is saying, 
i.e., she no longer acts as the subject of consciousness. Even if this is not explicitly 
marked, ironic utterances typically feature someone (or some other group, possibly 
just another voice) other than the speaker as the subject of consciousness. In other 
words, an essential component of irony is the recognition of a distance between 
two evaluative positions, one assumed by the speaker and the other by the person 
or voice acting as the subject of consciousness (cf. Livnat 2004: 58, Chatman 1978: 
228–236). Th is allows the speaker to imply that her own evaluative vantage point 
is more adequate by questioning the appropriateness of the inherent vantage point 
of a representation. Hence, irony has an important relativizing function: things can 
be evaluated from multiple viewpoints but certain viewpoints are less adequate in 
a given discourse than others (cf. Haiman 1998: 18–27). A signifi cant corollary is 
that the adequateness of context-dependent vantage points may be evaluated along 
a scale, and the distance between them is a matter of degree.
(5) In the 1950’s, uncle Cohn is asked at a conference of the communist party:
– Comrade Cohn, don’t you have an opinion of your own?
– Of course I do, but I don’t agree with it.
Th e joke in (5) aptly illustrates the idea that irony and perspective are inter-
related: there may be multiple (and mutually exclusive) vantage points from which 
a situation can be evaluated and occasionally, they may even be linked to one and 
the same subject. Naturally, in the context of this joke, self-irony translates into 
the critique of an era.
A crucial point regarding irony is that it is not directly related to particular 
linguistic constructions; rather, its interpretation hinges on the context. To un-
derstand irony, one needs to be well-informed about the situation, the discourse 
topic, etc., otherwise no (or at best a very limited) ironic interpretation is available. 
However, this does not mean that there would be a shortage of optional linguistic 
devices that may help the listener recognize the perspectivization inherent in irony, 
hence reducing the risk of misunderstanding. 
Th ese devices can in fact be regarded as contextualization cues, as they only 
aid in the recognition of irony by directing attention to the need for drawing on 
contextual information. Th ese cues can come from various domains of the linguistic 
system. In spoken language, the most frequent marker of ironic attitude is a par-
ticular intonation pattern, which is distinguishable from the prosody of non-ironic 
utterances. Signifi cant prosodic cues include fl oating (or rising) intonation, a lower 
pitch, the exaggerated use of certain prosodic features (singsong, heavy accents, the 
lengthening of syllables etc.) and nasalization, accompanied by pauses or laughter. 
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Furthermore, spoken language also allows the use of paralinguistic devices such as 
mimics (winking, smiling sarcastically) and gestures (poking, tapping on the shoul-
der). In the written register, irony may be signalled by typographical conventions 
including the use of italics, quotation marks, or occasionally exclamation marks. 
Certain expressions or fi xed phrases can also be deployed to a similar eff ect (as they 
say, as we all know). As a general remark, it can be added that the linguistic markers 
of evidentiality and quoting (also a form of perspectivization) oft en contribute to 
the recognition of irony.
(6) Come in cramozin garmented;
For to Love martyr did he die.
Th ereof he swore on his manlihead,
Whenas he felt his end drawn nigh.
(From François Villon’s Ballad, by way of ending. Translation by John Payne.)
As (6) shows, the recognition of irony in an utterance may be helped by the 
linguistic context (or “co-text”), as the presence of incompatible elements in the same 
sentence (martyr vs. manlihead) makes an ironic interpretation highly probable. 
Th is is further accentuated by the phrase he felt, explicitly marking perspectivization.
2.2. Irony as covert metapragmatic refl ection
It follows from the above that irony represents one way in which discourse par-
ticipants can express a refl ective attitude to the linguistic choices they or others 
are making. It serves to direct attention at the linguistic activity itself, and profi le 
(a high level of) metapragmatic refl ection (cf. Verschueren 1999: 187–198). In eff ect, 
irony involves the overwriting of a linguistic representation (utterance or utterance 
part) by a meta-representation that questions the adequacy of its evaluative vantage 
point (cf. Curcó 2000, Livnat 2004).
(7) I know your heart is bleeding for me
and the shore is awash with your tears
when, with a sportsman’s elegance,
Fate sends a bullet into me.
In (7) above, which is the translation of an excerpt from a Hungarian song’s 
lyrics, the passages your heart is bleeding for me and the shore is awash with your tears 
refl ect the speaker’s ironic attitude to the representations they express, suggesting 
that they are construed inadequately. Hence, irony may be viewed as a special kind 
of implicit meaning construal suggesting a high level or metapragmatic refl ection, 
which is not bound to a particular grammatical construction.
Prototypically, irony implies a critical attitude to the evaluative vantage point 
of a representation; however, it may also imply praise. One reason for the predomi-
nance of negative irony may be that the representation highlighting an ironic at-
titude expresses social norms violated by the situation at hand. In such cases, irony 
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has a moral aspect to it: not only does it imply that the person or community fails 
to comply with a given norm, but also that it should take steps to the contrary. In 
other instances, the irony suggests criticism because of its exaggerating character.
When it is applied in a given interaction, irony may serve a wide range of com-
municative demands or social expectations (cf. Attardo 2000a). Firstly, it may reinforce 
the sense of belonging to a group, especially when irony is directed at a third person 
or party. Here, the sense that the speaker and the addressee belong together comes at 
the expense of the outsider or group of outsiders. However, discourses characterized 
by self-irony or irony directed at the addressee may also refl ect a feeling of “talking 
the same language”. Secondly, irony may indicate the superiority of the speaker, i.e., 
the fact that he is in control of the situation, is capable of viewing it from outside or 
from above; furthermore, that he can play with language by saying one thing and 
meaning another. Th irdly, irony may express politeness as it allows the speaker to avoid 
direct confrontation. Owing to its indirect or vague character, negative irony may 
blunt criticism, while positive irony may help the speaker avoid any inconvenience 
that open praise might bring in its wake (cf. Leech 1983: 142–151).
Irony may satisfy these communicative demands because in its own covert 
way it exploits a fundamental aspect of linguistic cognition and communication: the 
extraordinary capacity of humans to refl ect on their own linguistic activity, on the 
utterances they or others are making, and on the conscious processes behind them.
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